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By Edward R. Parson
I’m going to begin this discussion of the Gulf oil spill by backing up 
and placing this catastrophe in the context of larger-scale problems 
with current energy policy, in the United States and globally. 
As shocking as the situation in the Gulf of Mexico may be, in this 
broader context it must be regarded as a normal event. That’s not 
to say that it’s normal in relation to past experience. Rather, the 
Gulf spill is “the new normal,” in the sense that our current energy 
strategy—or lack thereof—will make such events increasingly 
likely, even if we assume conditions of effective regulation and 
responsible compliance that evidently were not present on the 
Deepwater Horizon.
The BP operation was 40 miles offshore, in water 5,000 feet deep, 
and yet it was far from being the most extreme of today’s drilling 
locations. Plenty of wells are operating and in development deeper 
and farther offshore. The current record holder is in 10,000 feet of 
water, nearly twice the depth of BP’s well.
Why are we pursuing resources in such difficult places? Partly 
because technology makes it possible; and partly because oil 
prices and supply constraints, current and anticipated, make it 
worth going after these resources.
The U.S. and world economies depend on fossil fuels for more 
than 80 percent of their total energy supplies, and for almost 100 
percent of their transportation fuels. Yet even as world demand 
grows, particularly in the economies of Asia, production of easily 
extractable oil from easily reached places is in decline. 
Consequently, market conditions are forcing production toward 
increasingly remote, sensitive, and dangerous places, continually 
pushing the limits of advancing technology.
Absent a concerted move in a different direction, these trends will 
continue, bringing ever smaller extensions to the lifespan of these 
finite resources, at the price of increasing risk and environmental 
harm. On this trajectory, events like the Gulf spill may well become 
commonplace.
This is a global energy crisis—but we appear not to be noticing, 
largely because it is so unlike the energy crises of the 1970s. 
Those came on fast, triggered by individual acts and political 
events such as the OPEC embargo of 1973 and the Iranian supply 
disruption in the 1979 revolution.  
This one, by contrast, is slow and structural, driven by the gradual 
but inexorable divergence between growing global demand and 
increasingly scarce and difficult supply, and it will have no simple 
or quick resolution. It cannot be reversed by any single act, such as 
persuading OPEC to lift its embargo, or by increasing U.S. domestic 
production, since there simply isn’t enough available.
Rather, the only possible response is to reduce dependence on 
scarce energy sources through large-scale shifts in both demand 
(using less energy through efficiency improvements and other 
adjustments) and supply (developing new resources). This will 
mean higher—but not necessarily unreasonable—energy prices. 
Given a strong program of research, technology development, and 
investment, there are plenty of opportunities to achieve the 
required new energy supplies and demand reductions.
But there are perils on this path. We face not just one slow-moving 
energy crisis but two: the crisis of energy supply security as 
conventional oil and gas sources decline, and the crisis of climate 
change from the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions that are tightly 
linked to fossil-fuel use. These two crises are related, but they are 
not the same, and we must solve them both. Unfortunately, some 
widely supported solutions to the problem of energy supply 
security would not only fail to solve the problem of climate change 
but would make it much worse.
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Whether we successfully navigate both crises will depend on 
where we turn for new energy sources as cheap oil declines. The 
simplest path would be to continue obtaining liquid fuels from 
fossil resources, chasing oil in ever more remote locations, and 
shifting to unconventional resources such as oil sands and liquids 
processed from coal or shale, which require intensive upstream 
processing.
From the viewpoint of present energy industries and regulatory 
approaches, this is the familiar path, with incremental development 
of existing technologies. There are plenty of these resources to 
meet world demand for decades, and the 
approach has strong proponents. But this path 
would make climate change much worse, not 
only because it would continue using carbon-
based fuels to meet growing demand, but 
because the required upstream processing 
sharply increases the CO2 emitted in 
delivering each unit of energy, nearly doubling 
that number for some sources.
Attempting to extend the energy supply in this 
way would commit us to a high-CO2 pathway 
for much of the century, or a wrenching and 
costly adjustment if we later realize our error 
and change course after major investments 
are made.
Ultimately, the route to a climate-safe future 
is not compatible with large-scale movement 
toward liquids from coal, oil sands, or other 
heavy hydrocarbons as replacements for 
declining cheap oil. Avoiding dangerous 
climate change requires that, as cheap oil declines, we shift 
instead to new energy sources that do not emit greenhouse gases: 
renewables such as solar, wind, hydro, and nuclear power. This 
option does not require the sudden stoppage of fossil fuel use. 
There can be an extended transition period, provided new fossil 
investments include technologies to separate the carbon and store 
it underground, rather than emitting it into the atmosphere.
Taking this path would require sensible market incentives to devel-
op and invest in climate-safe sources by making greenhouse gas 
emissions costly, such as emission taxes or cap-and-trade systems. 
With such policies steering investors toward low- and non-emitting 
technologies, the most dangerous routes to meeting energy de-
mand as cheap oil declines would be priced out of the market.
If we develop these incentives sensibly—and implement them 
gradually—it’s likely that we can still limit climate change at a 
modest cost. Most analyses suggest the price of avoiding the 
worst (but not all) risks of climate change to be about one percent 
of future GDP. The problem is, we’ve been waiting on the starting 
line for more than 20 years, and the time for such a low-pain fix is 
running out. The longer we wait, the harder it will be.
The BP oil spill is not merely a symptom of the destructive direction 
current energy policy is heading. It is an attention-grabbing event 
that will influence the broader politics of energy, for good or ill.  
To his credit, President Obama has used the crisis to promote 
comprehensive energy and climate legislation. But the current 
congressional bills and administration proposals, although better 
than nothing, are too weak to drive the required reorientation of 
investment and research throughout the energy sector. Also, the 
president’s June address to the nation was distressingly 
ambivalent as to the policies needed to end our dependence on 
fossil fuels.
While the spill may provide an opportunity to change the direc-
tion of America’s dangerously unsustainable energy strategy, the 
opportunity to craft a more sustainable 
strategy poses many challenges and risks. It 
is hard to get the policies right, providing 
strong enough long-term incentives to move 
investment and R&D toward a radically dif-
ferent energy future while limiting short-
term disruptions. It is perhaps even harder 
to get the politics right, because, with 
the possible exception of reducing federal 
entitlement programs, there is nothing in 
American politics more dangerous than 
raising the price of gasoline (just ask anyone 
involved in attempts to increase federal 
fuel taxes during the Carter or Clinton 
administrations).
Energy prices can only increase as the end 
of the cheap-oil era approaches; and they 
must increase a little more to move us to the 
energy path that limits climate change. 
Explaining this fact persuasively is among 
the jobs of the president and congressional leaders. Unfortunately, 
there are many ways for them to get it wrong.
They could, for example, draft legislation that gives away too 
much to current fossil interests (e.g., by over-reliance on “clean 
coal”) or to other claimants (e.g., by building complex credit and 
offset systems that reward short-term trading and weaken 
incentives for long-term investments). Or they could subscribe to 
magical thinking about the ability of technology to solve the 
climate and energy problems, without policy incentives.
Perhaps most dangerous, reaction to the spill could trigger short-
term energy price spikes. This could be caused by several factors, 
including the direct regulatory response to the spill, proposed 
new climate and energy policies, world market conditions, and 
strategic behavior by firms. (If you doubt the last possibility, 
recall Enron’s role in the California electricity crisis of 2000.) Such 
a price spike, in turn, could lead to a backlash against long-term 
climate and energy policies and a panic to develop new fossil 
resources.
This is a real risk. If such a scenario unfolds, the resultant weak-
ening or blockage of urgently needed climate and energy policies 
would be an even more damaging consequence of the spill than 
its direct harm to the Gulf region.
Our current 
energy 
strategy—or 
lack thereof—
will make 
such events 
increasingly 
likely.
